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According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
Kansas, no remarks of counsel derogatory to the dignity of
the trial judge should be tolerated by an appellate
Attorney,
court; and if an attorney indulges in this line of
Scandalous
argument, he is liable to have his brief stricken
Brief
from the files, or to be disbarred from practicing in.that court:
State v. Gallup,42 Pac. Rep. 4o6. The brief in this case spoke
of the trial judge as working himself into a frenzy, and of his
being undignified and partisan; and it was ordered to be
stricken from the files.
To substantially the same effect are In re Pilbrook, 105
Cal. 471; S. C., 38 Pac. Rep. 884; Peo. v. Green, 9 Colo.
506. The rule extends to any brief or pleading containing
scandalous matter, by which is understood the "allegation of
anything which is unbecoming the dignity of the court to hear,
contrary to good manners, or which charges some person with
a crime not necessary to be shown in the cause; to which
may be added, that any unnecessary allegations bearing
cruelly upon the moral character of an individual, is also
scandalous: " Rap & L. Law Dict. I 151 ; Thomas v. Berry,
17 Colo. 322.
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When real estate is exposed to sale at public auction under
a written advertisement, the intention of the seller as to the
Auction Sale, thing he intends to sell, and of the buyer as to
Advertisewhat he intends to buy, is to be ascertained by the
ment
advertisement, and not by conversations or letters
-which passed between the parties in prior negotiations for
a private sale, which had failed and been abandoned. The
advertisement binds both parties: Maginnis v. Union Oil Co.,
(Supreme Court of Louisiana,) 18 So. Rep. 459.
Since the legal profession has in many states been opened
to the ladies, it is only fair that they should be considered
in selecting matters of interest, and, fortunately,
"Baltment
for Hire,
the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, with
Dressmakers most portentous gravity, has just delivered, sicut
moans, a weighty opinion upon a matter that is perhaps dearer
to the female heart than any other. In Lincoln v. Gay, 42 N.
E. Rep. 95, that court held, that a. dressmaker who receives
goods to be made into a dress is a bailee for hire, and must
exercise reasonable care and skill in determining whether the
cloth should be made up wrong side out; and that the mere
knowledge of one who has delivered goods to a dressmaker
to be made into a dress, that it is being made up wrong side
out, will not estop her to sue for damages to the goods, in the
absence of evidence that the dressmaker was induced by her
conduct to make it up wrong side out when it would not
otherwise have been so made, and that she knew or reasonably could have known that the dressmaker would act on such
conduct. It is to be regretted that the court did not have
occasion to pass upon the question whether or not the customer could recover damages for the vexation of spirit and
mental anguish caused by not being able to appear in her new
dress on schedule time, and also whether her husband could
recover for his loss of sleep and mental suffering caused by
his being compelled to listen to the lamentations of his spouse.
The Court of Appeal of England, in Linfoot v. Pocket,
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[1895] 2 Ch. 835, has lately rendered a decision that calls
il of Sale

usprops
Loans,
Validity

strongly for legislative remedy. The plaintiff,
desiring a loan, had applied to the defendant,
one of the numerous gentlemen who make
loans on furniture, etc., as a special conve-

nience to the borrower, and obtained from him a loan of
4ioo, in consideration of which he assigned to the defendant
certain chattels, and agreed to pay for the same "the principal
sum, together with the interest then due, as follows: the sum
of 46 on December 5, 1894, on account of interest and principal, and a like sum of 46 on account as aforesaid on the 5th
day of each and every succeeding month thereafter." This
document was signed by him without reading it. On December 5th the plaintiff paid the first instalment, and the defendant
sent him a receipt in a book, on the cover of which were
printed certain " Rules and regulations which are strictly
.adhered to." These rules and regulations contained various
provisions very burdensome to the plaintiff, which had not
previously been mentioned to him. He did not assent so as
to bind himself to them; but the defendant afterward wrote
to him treating the rules and regulations as part of the bargain, The plaintiff brought suit to have the written agreement cancelled, on the ground of fraud in procuring it, and
also on the ground that it was subject to a condition or defeasance not expressed in it. But the court held that he could
not have any redress on either of these grounds; for, in the
first place, he was not cheated into signing the bill of sale, but
chose deliberately to sign it; and in the second place, as the
bargain was complete at the time when the bill of sale was
executed, and the rules and regulations formed no part of it,
the false statement of the defendant that they were part of the
bargain did not enable the court to hold as against him that
they were part of it, and so to hold the bill of sale void as
being made subject to a condition or defeasance not expressed
in it.
The court regretted its inability to come to a different conclusion, and very strongly expressed their sympathy with the
,plaintiff; but felt themselves unable in the present state of the

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

law to relieve him from the consequences of his own folly.
There can be no question that all legislatures should provide
by law against contingencies such as this; for sharks of this
kind are not only already too numerous, but are rapidly
increasing in numbers.
The Supreme Court of Georgia has lately decided a case of
great importance as involving the question of the liability of
a sleeping-car company for the loss of a passenCarriers,
Sleeping-car ger's property.
The plaintiff, who had taken a
Companies,
Liability for
Loss of

berth in a sleeping-car, after being assured that the
Passenger's car would go through to his destination, was sudEffects
denly roused by the porter and told that he would
have to get up quick, or he would be left. He rose hurriedly,
gathered up his clothes, and went to the next car. Afterwards,
on looking over his clothes, he discovered that his money and
some papers were gone. Neither were ever restored to him.
Afterwards, on the reverse side of his berth ticket was the following: "Baggage, wearing apparel, money, jewelry, and other
valuabies taken into the car will be entirely at owner's risk,
and employes of this company are forbidden to take charge of
the same." Under these facts the court held:
(i) That a sleeping-car company is under the duty of
maintaining such watch and guard while the passenger is
sleeping as is reasonably necessary to secure the safety of
such valuables or baggage as he may properly carry on his
person or have in his possession while traveling in the car;
and if such property is taken from his possession while he is
asleep, the burden rests upon'the company of showing that
the loss did not occur because of a failure on the part of its
employes to discharge this duty.
(2) That though it would ordinarily be a good defence that
the loss of the property was occasioned by the negligence of
the passenger, yet, if it appears that the acts of the latter
alleged to be negligent were caused by the wrongful conduct
of the company itself, the latter is estopped to claim immunity
because of such acts.
(3) That proper diligence on the part of a sleeping-car
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company towards one of its patrons involves the exercise of
ordinary care in looking out for and taking care of such property as may be accidentally left by him in a car of the company when leaving it, and the restitution of the property to
the owner, when ascertained; and if such property is actually
found by the servants of the company, or is left or dropped in
such a place and under such circumstances as that, by the
exercise of ordinary care, it ought to have been found by
them, the company will be liable for its value: 'ates v. PullIan Palace Car Co., 23 S. E. Rep. 186.
According to the Supreme Court of Arkansas, the statute
of that state, (S. & H. Dig. Ark., § 2412,) which authorizes
Constitutional the governor to grant pardons on condition that
Law,
persons pardoned shall leave the state and not
Pardon on
Condition
return to it, is not in conflict with the Constitution,
Art. 2, § 2 1, providing that no person shall be exiled from the
state: Exparte Hawkins, 33 S. W. Rep. io6.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of the
United States, under the Act of 1891, March 3, (26 Stat. at
Large, § 27, c. 517,) which, in § 5, authorizes
Court,
Jurisdiction appeals or writs of error from the district or cirCircuit

Court of
Appeals

cuit courts directly to the Supreme Court in cases
of conviction of an infamous crime, though, by

section 6, it gives the circuit court of appeals power to review
decisions in the circuit or district courts in cases not provided
for by the preceding section, and in terms makes its judgment
final in criminal cases, the decisions of the circuit court of
appeals are not .final in cases of infamous crimes: Folsom v.
United States, i6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 222.
The Supreme Court of the United States has finally settled
the question, on which the State courts have been unanimous,
CriminalLaw [See 2 A,%i. L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 718,] that a
Dueprocessof statute which provides that a person who has been
Law,

Twice In
before convicted
Jeopardy, -pnsmsbeun
punishment for
Secondy,
viction

of crime shall suffer a severer
a subsequent offense than for a
first offense is not invalid, as causing him to be
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twice put in jeopardy for the same offense, nor as providing acruel and unusual punishment, in violation of the Fourteenth
Amendment to the Constitution of the United States: Moore
v. State of Missouri, 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 179, affirming 121 Mo.
514; S. C., 26 S. W. Rep. 345.
It also held, in the same case, that it belongs to the state
courts to determine whether an indictment in such
Courts,
Jurisdiction a court for a major offense is sufficient to support
a conviction of a minor offense.
When a county court delivers persons convicted by it of
murder to a jailer for safe-keeping till brought back for execuJurisdiction tion, the governor has no authority to counterover Convicts mand a subsequent order of that court requiring
the jailer to deliver them up, nor will the fact that a writ of
error and supersedeas had been awarded each of the prisoners
by the Supreme Court justify the jailer in refusing to deliver
up the prisoners on the order of the court that committed
them; but the fact that a court having jurisdiction has granted
the prisoners a writ of habeas corpus will justify such a refusal :Cardoza v. Epps, (Supreme Court of Appeals of Virginia,) 23
S. E. Rep. 296.
In In re Paschial,42 Pac. Rep. 373, the Supreme Court of
Kansas has lately decided a rather infrequent question of
criminal Iitw, as to the effect of an irregular senExcessive
It holds that
tence on a regular conviction.
Sentence,
Effect on
Validity of

Conviction

when a prisoner has been arraigned before a court
of competent jurisdiction, on a criminal charge,

and pleads guilty thereto, and the court thereupon imposes
a sentence of confinement in the penitentiary for a period
longer than that authorized by law, the judgment and sentence
are not void in toto, if the court had authority to impose the
punishment actually adjudged against the prisoner on a conviction of a higher grade of the offense; and the prisoner will
not be discharged on habeas corpus before the expiration of
the minimum period of punishment fixed by the statute for the
offense actually charged, which the court was required to
impose in the case.
The court declined, on the ground that it was unnecessary

PROGRESS OF THE LAW.

to the decision of the case, to pass upon the question whether
the prisoner could be discharged on habeas corpus after he
had served out so much of the sentence as the law required or
permitted the court to impose, or not.
The Laws of Wisconsin for 1893, c. 63, make the possession of burglars' tools, adapted to break open places of
deposit in order to take therefrom any money
Burglary,
Possession of or property, with intent to use them for
such
Burglars'
Tools
purpose, a criminal offence.
This statute has
been recently under discussion by the Supreme Court of that
state, in Scott v. State, 65 N. W. Rep. 61, which decided:
(i) That an information alleging possession with the intent
to break open places of deposit in general, and take property
therefrom, without specifying any particular place or property,
is sufficient under the statute.
(2) That when, on a prosecution for having possession of
burglars' tools, with intent to use them, evidence is adduced
by the prosecution that, on the arrest of the defendant while
stealing a ride on an express train, the tools were found concealed in his pants and shoes, and that the tools found formed
a complete burglar's kit, except the brace, which is always
obtained at the place of operation; and the defendant testifies
that he found the tools, it is proper to refuse to take the case
from the jury.
(3) That when, on such a prosecution, the only evidence is
that the defendant, when arrested, had concealed on his person
all the tools usually carried by burglars, and there is no evidence that he has ever been convicted of theft, an assertion in
argument by the prosecuting attorney that the defendant is a
thief, and a ruling by the court that that assertion is warranted by the evidence, is ground for reversal.
The Supreme Court of the State of Louisiana in State v.
Noise (not yet reported), has recently handed down an imporCriminal
Procedure,
Power of
District
Attorney to
enter a Nolle
Prosequi

tant opinion in regard to procedure and practice
in criminal prosecutions, defining the functions

and authority of the district attorney, and his
r
after the conviction
right to enter a noll,'rosequi
of the accused. The case was an application for
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a writ of mandamus, founded upon the following state of facts:
The defendant in a criminal prosecution for perjury had been
found guilty by the jury, and a motion for a new trial had
been overruled by the respondent, who was the presiding
judge. Subsequently, but before sentence had been imposed,
the district attorney (the relator) tendered in open court a
formal motion to nwlle prosequi the case, and "declared that
he would no further prosecute the said cause;" the object
of this action apparently being to have the defendant discharged from custody so that he might testify in certain other
prosecutions without his testimony being discredited by his
conviction. The respondent refused to order the filing of the
said motion, or the making the same a part of the record;
whereupon the application to the Supreme Court for a writ of
mandamus was made.
The contention of the relator was that, inasmuch as the legislature had not expressly restricted the exercise of the power by
the prosecuting officer to entei" a nolle prosequi,or placed the
same under the control of the court, his authority in that respect
must depend upon the common law, and could be exercised
independently of the court. But Mr. Justice WATKINS, in
delivering the opinion of the court, decided: (I) That sentence
by the court is not essential to the completion of a "conviction," and therefore is not a necessary precedent to the exercise of pardoning power; and (2) that as the pardoning
power is thus available, the district attorney cannot give
relief of his own motion.
The court observed that criminal prosecutlons in that state
are quite different from those in England, and also that the
power of the prosecuting officer is there greatly diminished;
and concluded that "there are three stages of a criminal
prosecution, viz. :
" First. The inauguration or preliminary stage, when the
prosecuting officer has absolute control of his indictments.
"Second. The trial of the cause, and its, incidents, during
which the court has control and the power of the prosecuting
officer is suspended.
" Third. The period between the verdict of the jury and the
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sentence of the court, when the pardoning power comes into
operation."
The application was accordingly denied. It is to be regretted that space will not admit of a more extended reference
to the learned and exhaustive opinion of the court upon the
important questions of law involved.
The Supreme Court of California has recently held,following
Berly v. Young, 98 Cal. 446; S. C. 33 Pac. Rep. 338, that if
a deed made to a child of the grantor is delivered
Deed,
Escrow,
to him in escrow, with instructions to hold the
Delivery to

Grantee

same without reading it until the death of the

grantor, who thereby parted with all control over it, it is
valid, and operates to vest the title in the grantee immediately, subject to the life estate of the grantor: 1'ittcnbrock v.
Cass, 42 Pac. Rep. 300.
There is an annotation on this subject in i AM. L. REG. &
REv. (N. S.) 141.

The Supreme Court of Wyoming has lately held that the
name of a candidate, though nominated by more than one
Elections,

Ballots,
Preparation,

party, should be only placed once upon the ballot
as a candidate for the same office, but that as the

candidates are given an opportunity to inspect the
ballots before they are sent out, and to apply to
Twice
the courts to correct any errors therein,
the printing of the name of a candidate twice, if not objected to by the
opposing candidates, must be held to have been waived by
them. It further held that if it shall be shown that any voter
indicated by two crosses on the same ballot an intention to
vote for a candidate, placing a cross after her name in each
place where it appeared on the ballot, it should only be
counted as one vote: Sawin v. Pease, 42 Pac. Rep. 750.
In JMcKittrick v. Pardee, 65 N. W. Rep. 23, the Supreme
Court of South Dakota has passed upon a number of questions as to the validity of ballots under the Ballot
Ballots,
Marking
Law of that State, and has held (i) That when
the voter makes a mark or cross in the circle at the head of a
party ticket, and erases no name thereon, the vote must be
PrintingName
of Candidate
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counted for the whole ticket, though names on other tickets
are properly marked with a cross at the left; (2) That a cross
at the head of a party ticket, but not within the circle "printed
for that purpose," is a mere. nullity, and the vote cannot be
counted for any candidate upon that ticket whose name is not
otherwise marked as prescribed by law; (3) That crosses at
the head of two or more party tickets simply neutralize each
other; (4) That if an elector erases the names of all the candidates on all the party tickets, except one, he does not thereby
vote the ticket on which the names are not erased, unless he
makes a cross in the circle at the head of that party ticket, or
properly marks the names of the candidates on that ticket for
whom he desires to vote ; (5) That if there is no cross made
at the head of any party ticket, no erasures are necessary, but
the elector may designate the candidates for whom he desires
to vote by simply making a cross opposite each name; (6)
That an elector cannot vote for a candidate whose name is
printed on the ballot, by writing his name upon another party
ticket; and (7) That a cross to the right of a candidate's
name, when the law requires it to be made at the left, is a
nullity, and should be disregarded.
Under the Ballot Law of Colorado, which provides that
whei one desires to vote for all the nominees of a particular
party, he may do so by placing a cross opposite the emblem
of the party, but when he desires to vote a mixed ticket he
shall place a cross opposite the names of the candidates for
whom he elects to vote, if a cross has been put opposite the
emblem of a party, and one opposite the name of each of the
candidates of that party, with certain exceptions, the ticket
should not be counted for those candidates of that party opposite whose names crosses are not put.
Since this statute merely provides that the voter shall place
a cross opposite the name of each candidate of his choice,
it makes no difference whether it is placed to the right or to
the left of the names; and though the statute declares that a
vote for all the candidates of a party may be cast by placing
a cross opposite the emblem of that party, in the appropriate
space, it is immaterial that the cross is slightly outside and to
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the right of the space prepared therefor: Young v. Simpson,.
(Supreme Court of Colorado,) 42 Pac. Rep. 666.
This last ruling is hardly in agreement with the weight of
authority, which seems to consider the intent of the voter of
but little importance, while this decision rests expressly on the
See
ground that that intent is of paramount importance.
I A, . L. REG. & REV. (N. S.) 748; 2 Am. L. RIEG. & REV.
(N. S.) 85, 155,

222,

491, 556, 638, 719, 780.

Under the Illinois Statute, which requires voters to mark
a cross in the square opposite the name of the candidates of
their choice, it has recently been decided by the Supreme
Court of that state, that a ballot in which two lines that do not
cross are marked in the square, should not be counted; and
also that neither a ballot in which a cross is marked outside
of the square and between the names of two candidates for
the same office, nor one that merely shows pencil erasures of
all the names on one ticket, is valid: Apple v. Barcroft,
41 N. E. Rep. ii16.
The Court of Appeal of England has lately held that the
sheriff may, for the purpose of executing a writ of
Execution,
Service of fieri facias, break open the outer door of a workWrit,
Breaking
Door

shop or other building of the judgment debtor,
not being his dwelling-house or connected there-

with: Hodderv. Williams, [1895]

2

Q. B. 663.

The Court of Appeal of New York, in Schuyler v. Curtis,
42 N. E. Rep. 22, has had one of those rare opportunities
under present circumstances, a case of general
Infunction,
first impression, and it is to be regretted that it
Erecting
Statue of

Deceased

Person,

Rights of
Relatives

failed signally to rise to the occasion. One

of the

innumerable associations which form an outlet for

the pent-up folly of the mass of humanity conceived the idea that it would be an admirable thing for the
world in general, and incidentally as an exploitation of themselves, to procure two statues of female subjects, typifying
"woman as the philanthropist," and " woman as the reformer,"
to be exhibited at the Chicago Exposition of 1893. As the
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subject of the first of these the association selected Mrs. G.
L. Schuyler, then deceased, and as the second Miss Susan B.
Anthony. Mrs. Schuyler's reiatives very properly objected,
both to the making of the statue and the company in which
Mrs. Schuyler's image was to find itself, and, having vainly
requested the association to desist, brought action for an
injunction to restrain the erection of the statue. This was
granted by the Supreme Court; but that decision was reversed
by the Court of Appeals, on the ground that the relatives of
the deceased had no rights in the premises which were
infringed by the erection of the statue, the right of privacy,
which was most strongly urged, being personal to the
deceased, and having died with her, and the claim as fo mental distress caused to her relatives being, in the opinion of the
court, a chimera. The court thus proves these points.
"' Whatever right of privacy Mrs. Schuyler had died with her.
Death deprives us all of right in the legal sense of that term,
and, when Mrs. Schuyler died, her own individual right of
privacy, whatever it may have been, expired at the same time.
The right which survived (however extensive or limited) was
a right pertaining to the living only. It is the right of privacy
of the living which it is sought to enforce here. A woman
like Mrs. Schuyler may very well in her lifetime have been
most strongly adverse to any public notice, even if it were of
a most flattering nature, regarding her own works or position.
She may have been (and the evidence tends most strongly to
show that she was) of so modest and retiring a nature than
any publicity, during her life, would have been to her most
extremely disagreeable and obnoxious. All these feelings
died with her. It is wholly incredible that any individual
could dwell with feelings of distress or anguish upon the
thought that, after his death, those whose welfare he had toiled
for in life would inaugurate a project to erect a statue in token
of their appreciation of his efforts and in honor of his memory.
This applies as well to the most refined and retiring woman as
to a public man. It is, therefore, impossible to credit the
existence of any real mental injury or distress to a surviving
relative grounded upon the idea that the action proposed in

PROGRESS OF THE LAV.

honor of his ancestor would have been disagreeable to that
ancestor during his life ...
"In this class of cases there must, in addition, be some
reasonable and plausible ground for the existence of this
mental distress and injury. It must not be the creation of
mere caprice nor of pure fancy, nor the result of a supersensitive and morbid mental organization, dwelling with
undue emphasis upon the exclusive and sacred character of
this right of privacy. Such a class of mind might regard the
right as interfered with and violated by the least reference,
even of a complimentary nature, to some illustrious ancestor,
without first seeking for and obtaining the consent of his
descendants. Feelings that are thus easily and unnaturally
injured and distressed under such circumstances are much too
sensitive to be recognized by an), purely earthly tribunal."
In marked contrast to this is the language of the dissenting
opinion of Justice GRAY: "She never was a public character,
and in no just sense can it be said that, because of what she
chose to do in the private walks of life, she dedicated her
memory to the state or nation as public property. To hold
that, by reason of her constant and avowed interest in philanthropical works unconnected with public station, the right
accrued to an association of individuals, strangers to her blood,
to erect a statue of her, typifying a human virtue, through
contributions solicited from the general public, is, in my judgment, to assert a proposition at war with the moral sense,
and I believe it to be in violation of the sacred right of privacy,
whose mantle should cover not only the person of the individual, but every personal interest which he possesses and is
entitled to regard as private, when through no act of his, nor
by anypeculiar circumstances, has the public acquired any right
in them. Unless equity does interfere, the right of privacy will
be lost, and that will become the property of the public which,
our sentiments and reason and our sense of justice tells us,
is the private property of the relatives of the deceased
person. . . . It is not necessary that the proposed statue of
Mrs. Schuyler should be libelous in its nature. The wrong
consists, not in that fact, but in the unauthorized acts of the
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defendants, which will invite adverse comment and public
criticism upon the life and character of the deceased, bring her
name and memory into more or less unenviable notoriety, and
inflict upon her immediate relatives and representatives more
or less injury in their feelings and their desires for that privacy
which, in their private station of life, they have the right to
enjoy."
Justice GRAY'S opinion is founded on the better reason. The
result of the majority view is that the feelings of the court are
made the criterion of the right of the relatives to enjoin such a
statue, not their own. But this is a thing that the court has
no right to do. Further, even granting that the court would,
as it admits, enjoin the erection of a libelous statue, what
security is there that the judgment of the court would be
sufficiently reliable to prevent scandal and obloquy being cast
on the dead. We are left to a beautiful uncertainty. As a
writer in the New York Evening Post says :
"The inconveniences which may arise under the decisions
are, that any man's enemies or blackmailers may annoy any
family with perfect impunity, or extort money from them by
proposing to build, and by collecting money for a monument
calculated to make a deceased person's memory odious or
ridiculous, or to drag it into a kind of publicity which he when
living would have loathed. The decision, in fact, is in entire
harmony with the state of public feeling which has given us a
sensational and scandalous press, by treating the individual's
dislike of notoriety as of no consequence, so long as it amuses
or entertains the majority. In truth, we do not see that it
would not authorize a monument to a living man in spite of
his protest or prohibition, and make his opposition to it
'fanciful,' although it brought into prominence a defect, or an
eccentricity, or a deplored and recanted opinion."
A private character may enjoin the publication of his portrait; but a public character cannot, in the absence of breach
of contract or violation of confidence in securing the photograph from which the publication is made: Corliss v. E. W.
Walker Co., 64 Fed. Rep. 28o, reversing 57 Fed. Rep. 434.
An actor, curiously enough, has been held to be a private
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individual within this rule. In Marks v. Jqffa, 26 N. Y.
Suppl. 908 ; S.C., 6 Misc. Rep. 290, the plaintiff, an actor by
profession, who was then engaged in the study of the law,
declined to give his consent to the publication of his portrait,
with that of another well known actor, in the defendant's
newspaper, with an invitation to the readers thereof to vote as
to which was the more popular; in spite of which the defendant published the pictures and invited the contest; and it was
held that the plaintiff was entitled to an injunction to restrain
the continuance of such publication.
There is an annotation on this subject in 2 A.\i. L. REG. &
REv. (N. S.) 134.

According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
Missouri, Division No. i, an injunction will lie, at least in
invalid

those states where legal and equitable remedies

are administered by the same tribunal, to restrain
the enforcement of a municipal ordinance making it a misdemeanor to buy or sell certain articles except in the manner
therein described, if the ordinance in question is invalid, though
its invalidity has not been determined in a prosecution or an
action of a legal nature: Sylvester Coal Co. v. City of St.
Louis, 32 S.W. Rep. 649.
Ordinance

In Hilton v. Guyot, I6 Sup. Ct. Rep. 139, the Supreme
Court of the United States has decided, against a very strong
International
Law,
Foreign
Judgments,
Conclusiveness,

dissent, several most important questions relating

to the force and effect of foreign judgments, not
theretofore adjudicated by that court:
(I)

That " where there has been opportunity

Comity
for a full and fair trial abroad before a court of
competent jurisdiction, conducting the trial upon regular
proceedings, after due citation or voluntary appearance of the
defendant, and under a system of jurisprudence likely to
secure an impartial administration ofj ustice between the citizens
of its own country and those of other countries, and there is
nothing to show either prejudice in the court, or in the system
of laws under which it was sitting, or fraud in procuring the
judgment, or any other special reason why the comity of this
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nation should not allow it full effect, the merits of the case
should not, in an action brought in this country upon the
judgment, be tried afresh, as on a new trial or an appeal, upon
the mere assertion of the party that the judgment was
erroneous in law or in fact."
(2) That "when an action is brought in a court of this
country, by a citizen of a foreign country, against one of our
own citizens, to recover a sum of money adjudged by a court
of that country to be due from the defendant to the plaintiff,
and the foreign judgment appears to have been rendered by a
competent court, having jurisdiction of the cause and of the
parties, and upon due allegations and proofs, and opportunity
to defend against them, and its proceedings are according to
the course of a civilized jurisprudence, and are stated in a clear
and formal record, the judgment is primafade evidence, at
least, of the truth of the matter adjudged; and it should beheld conclusive upon the merits tried in the foreign court,
unless some special ground is shown for impeaching the
judgment, or by showing that it was affected by fraud or
prejudice, or that by the principles of international law, and
by the comity of our own country, it should not be given full
credit and effect."
(3) That "judgments rendered in France or any other
foreign country, by the laws of which our own judgments are
reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to full credit and
conclusive effect when sued upon in this country, but areprimafacie evidence only of the justice of the plaintiff's claim."
(4) That applying these rules, the judgment sued on in.
this case, (recovered in France,) was not conclusive, but reviewable on its merits, because such is the practice of the French
courts with regard to American judgments.
Chief Justice FULLER dissented fiom this result, on the
ground that the question was not one of comity at all, but
merely rested on the broad principle of public policy, appli-.
cable alike to foreign and domestic judgments, that their
should be an end of litigation. With him concurred Justices
HARLAN, BREWER and JACKSON.
In Ritchie v. Jcfffille', 16 Sup. Ct. Rep. 171, the same
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court applied these rule,. to a judgment recovered in a Canadian
court, and held that according to them it must be regarded as
conclusive, because the pleadings showed a submission to the
jurisdiction of a competent court, and the averments that the
judgment sued on was "irregular and void," and that there
was "no jurisdiction or authority on the part of the court to
enter such a judgment upon the facts and the pleadings,"
were mere general averments of legal conclusions, and so
insufficient to impeach the judgment,
The Supreme Court of Texas, in State v. Austin Club, 33
S. W. Rep. I 13, has reached the just conclusion, (which may
Intoxicating be commended to several courts for careful examLiquors,
ination,) that a club organized, in good faith, for
Social
Club
the promotion of social intercourse and the
encouragement of literature and art, in selling intoxicating
liquors, in a private manner, to its members and non-resident
guests alone, but with no view to profit, is not liable to a tax
imposed by statute on persons engaged in the occupation of
selling liquors. There is a full annotation on this subject, in
31 Aui. L. REG. & REXv. 861.
The Court of Appeal of England has recently decided a
question of great interest to sub-tenants. The defendants in
Landlord and that case, being possessed of a term of years in a
Tenant,
house, of which there were then eight and a half
Sub-lease,
Duration of
Covenant for
Quiet
Enjoyment

years unexpired, sub-let the premises by indenture
to the plaintiffs for a term of ten and a half years,

acting under a mistake, but in good faith. The
sub-lease did not contain any express covenant either for title
or for quiet enjoyment, nor did the words of letting include
the word "demise." The plaintiffs occupied the premises
until the end of the eight and a half years, when they were
evicted by the superior landlord. The plaintiff then brought
an action for breach of implied covenants for title and for
quiet enjoyment. But the court held, affirming the decision
of the Chief Justice, [1895] i Q. B. 820, that, even on the
assumption that in the absence of the word "demise" either
of such covenants could be implied in the lease, the duration
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of the covenant was limited by that of the lessor's own estate,
and that consequently the plaintiffs could not recover: Baynes
& Co. v. Lloyd & Sons, [1895] 2 Q. B. 61o.
In The Queen v. Hekir, [1895] 2 Ir.R. 709, the court for
Crown Cases Reserved of Ireland has decided, against a strong
dissent, that when the prosecutor, who owed the
Larceny,
Misappropria- prisoner a sum of money for work done in his
tionof
employment, handed him some silver and two
Property
Innocently
notes, supposing them to be Li notes, one being
Acquired
really a L'io note, the prisoner, having come into
possession of it innocently, was not guilty of larceny for
having appropriated the /io note to his own use, after he
discovered its true value.
According to a recent decision of the Court of Appeals of
New York, the fact that a person is a candidate
Libel,
Privilege
for election will not render privileged a communication charging him with incompetency in his profession:
Mattice v. JJifcoxr, 42 N. E. Rep. 270.
There is a full annotation on the subject of criticism of
public officers and candidates for public office, in 32 Ai~i. L.
REG. 669.
The Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey has lately
held that if one physician, being unable to attend to his
practice,
sends
another
in his stead, the
Negligence,
nt
t
n
h
sb
h former
nkl
Liability for is not liable to one who isinjured by the unskilActs of
fulness of the latter, since the latter, being enAnother

gaged in a distinct and independent occupation of
his own, is not the servant or agent of the former: Jfyers
v. Ho/born, 33 Atl. Rep. 388.
In State v. Sutton, 65 N. W. Rep. 262, the Supreine Court
of Minnesota has recently given a very valuable decision on
Oirtes,
the question of the extent of the disqualification of
Incompatian officer to hold an office declared incompatible
bility,
Disqualificawith the one he holds by prior title. Art. 4, § 9,
tion of

Officer
of the constitution of that state provides, that " no
senator or representative shall, during the time for which he is
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elected, hold any office under the authority of the United
States or the state of Minnesota, except that of postmaster."
The respondent was elected to serve as representative for the
term beginning on the first Monday of January, 1895, and
ending on the first Monday of January, 1897. He accordingly qualified and served during the session of 1895, and
resigned May 2, 1895, the session of the legislature having
terminated prior to that date. On May 4, 1895, he was appointed boiler inspector; and on quo warrantobrought to try
his title to that office, the court held that under the constitutional provision, his disability to holding office other than that
of member of the legislature did not cease until the expiration
of the full term for which he had been elected, and was consequently not removed by his resignation; and that therefore
he was disqualified to hold the office to which he had been
appointed.
According to a recent decision of the Supreme Court of
North Carolina, though the roll call of the house of reprefor
Parliamentary sentatives showed that a quorum assembled
the transaction of business, there is no presumpLaw,
Quorum
tion that a quorum was present, if the roll call on
the election of an officer disclose that less than a quorum
voted: State v. Ellington, 23 S. E. Rep. 250.
The Supreme Court of Minnesota has recently rendered a
decision of great importance to the railroad interests of the
Rairoads, country, holding that the erection and operation
Right of %xay, of a public elevator and warehouse upon land
Abandonment acquired by a railroad company by condemnation,
for public purposes, either by itself or by its lessee, constitutes
neither a misuser nor an abandonment of its easement in the
land occupied by that structure, and the owner in fee cannot
maintain ejectment for the land so occupied: Gurney v.
Minneapolis Union Elevator Co., 65 N. W. Rep. 136.
This ruling is more than doubtful. However necessary and
important the erection of such buildings may be to the successful financial operation of the road, they are not essential to
the easement of passage, which is all that a railroad company
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acquires in the land condemned by it. And even if they may
be erected, as in that state -they are allowed to be by statute,
on the right of way of the railroad, without its consent, it does
not follow that they may be thus erected without the consent
of the owner of the fee. That would be a taking of property
without due process of law, for there can be no question that
such an erection imposes an additional servitude on the fee.
That, as the court says apropos of one of its own conclusions,
"is a fact so obvious that it may be safely assumed without
argument." The legislature, therefore, could not, by merely
authorizing the construction of such buildings without the
consent of the railroad, by implication authorize their erection
without the consent of the owner of the fee; and it could not
authorize the latter by express terms, for the structures in
question and the corporations erecting them are not within
any of the recognized rules in regard to the acquisition. of
land under the right of eminent domain. On every view of
the case, then, this decision is unwarranted.
In State v. Corbett, 32 S. W. Rep. 686, the Supreme Court
of Arkansas has laid down some useful principles of constitutional law and statutory construction, holding, in
Statutes,
Passage,
the first place, that under a constitutional provision
Amendment that the final vote on the passage of a bill shll be
a recorded yea and nay vote, a statute is not invalid because
the house, in passing the original act, after amending the
senate bill, and passing it, as amended, by a yeaand nay vote,
which was recorded, receded from that amendment, by adopting a conference report, recommending such recession, without
taking the vote thereon by yeas and nays; and in the second
place, that when the title of an act states its purpose to be to
prevent a certain class of acts, and the first section declares
such acts to be criminal offenses, and a second prescribes the
degree of the offen.'e and its punishment, the fact that the latter
section is invalid will not render an act amending the prior
act invalid, though it expressly purports to amend the
void section, instead of the whole act; for " if the title had
been to amend the act of 1891, instead of the second section,
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there would have been no objection to the act as amended
...... and when the legislature has power to enact a law,
and its intention is manifest, effect will be given to the intention, rather than to a mere failure of its language to express or
describe what was intended."
As regards the first point, if a statute, having been regularly
passed in the house of its origin by a call for the yeas and
nays, is sent to the other house, and passed by it in like
manner, but in an amended form, and then returned to the
house whence it originated, it may be made a valid law, by a
simple concurrence of that house in the amendments, or upon
refusal of the latter to concur in the amendments, and the
appointment and report of a conference committee, it may be
validly passed by adopting that report by a simple vote of the
constitutional majority, without a call for the yeas and nays,
and the bill will be as valid as if passed again in that manner.
MP.cCulloch v, State, II Ind. 424; Hull v. Miller, 4 Neb. 503 ;

Peo. v. Superisors of Chenango, 8 N. Y. 317; Nelson v. Haywood Co., 91 Tenn. 596; S. C, 20 S. W. Rep. i. In Kentucky a yea and nay vote is required: Norman v. Ky. Board
of .3anagersof World's Columbian Exp., 93 Ky. 537; S. C., 20
S. W. Rep. 9Ol. If, however, the journals disclose the fact that
the constitutional majority failed to v9te for concurrence in the
amendments, or the adoption of the conference report, the bill is
invalid: Peo. v. DelVolf, 62 Ill. 253. Of course, if the vote on
concurrence or adoption is taken by yeas and nays, there can
be no doubt cast in the propriety of the procedure: Robtrtson
v. Peo., (Colo.) 38 Pac. Rep. 326; In re Division of Ho-ward
Co., 15 Kans. 194.

If, after a recession from an amendment, or concurrence
in a report recommending such recession, the amendment is
accidentally copied into the enrolled bill, which is signed in
that shape by the presiding officers of the two houses and by
the governor, the bill is wholly invalid : Jones v. Hutchinson,
43 Ala. 721 ; Smithee v. Campbell, 41 Ark. 471.
So far as the second point is concerned, it would have been
far better to have ba.sed this decision on the principle that
since the whole statute, after the amendment, has the same
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effect as if re-enacted with the amendment, an unconstitutional
statute may be amended into a constitutional one, so far as its
future operation is concerned, by removing its objectionable
provisions, or supplying others, so as to make it conform to
the requirements of the constitution: 1Valsh v. State, (Ind.) 41
N. E. Rep. 65 ; State v. Ciiy of Cincinnati,(Ohio,) 4o N. E.
Rep. 5o8, affirming 8 Ohio Cir. Ct. 523.
The Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. I, has recently decided, in accord with the consensus of authority, that
a court of equity may interfere by injunction to
Strikes,
Injunction prevent persons from attempting by intimidation,
threats of personal violence, and other unlawful means, to
force employes to quit work and join in a strike; for while
equity'will never interfere by injunction to prevent the commission of a crime, it may enjoin an act which threatens irreparable injury to the property of an individual, though that
act may also be a violation of a criminal law : HamiltonBrown Shoe Co. v. Saxtj', 32 S. W. Rep. I lo6.
The court adopts in extenso the language of the judge who
delivered the opinion in the court below, a part of which one
may be pardoned for quoting, because of the terse and forcible
manner in which he refutes the hair-splitting of some estimable
gentlemen who have endeavored, in the pages of this magazine,
to prove that equity cannot reined),such acts, because its action
in the premises involves a denial of the right of trial by jury.
"It will be observed that the defendants do not claim to have
the right to do what the injunction forbids them doing. Their
learned counsel even quotes the statute to show that it is a
crime to do so. But he contends that the Constitution of the
United States and the constitution of the state of Missouri
guarantee them the right to commit crime, with only this
limitation, to wit, that they shall answer for the crime, when
committed, in a criminal court, before a jury, and that to
restrain them from committing crime is to rob them of their
c,istitutional right of trial by jury. If that position be correct,
then there can be no valid statute to prevent crime. But that
position is contrary to all reason. The right of trial by jury
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does not arise until the party is accused of having already
committed the crime. If you see a man advancing upon
another with murderous demeanor and a deadly weapon, and
you arrest him, -disarm him,-you have perhaps prevented
an act which would have brought about a trial by jury, but
can you be said to have deprived him of his constitutional
right of trial by jury? [The learned judge inight well have
added, "Why cannot the law do what an individual may thus
do? "] The train of thought put in motion by the argument
of the learned counsel for defendants on this point leads only
to this end, to wit, that the constitution guarantees to every
man the right to commit crime, so that he may enjoy the
inestimable right of trial by jury."
It is to be regretted that lack of space forbids quoting the
admirable discussion of the question of the power of equity
,to act in the premises; but the following extract will indicate
the trend of that discussion. "What a humiliating thought
it would be if these defendants were really attempting to do
what the amended petition charges, and what their demurrer
confesses,-that is, to destroy the business of these plaintiffs,
and to force the eight or nine hundred men, women, boys and
girls who are earning their livings in the plaintiff's employ to
quit their work against their will,-and yet there is no law in
the land to protect them." It would be worse than humiliating; it would utterly destroy all confidence in the boasted
efficacy of the law to redress all injuries, and form a legal
basis for anarchy.
The acts of strikers in interfering with the business of an
employer by unlawful means, as by intimidating his workmen,
by force, menaces, or threats, to prevent them from working
on such terms as they may agree on with their employers, or
by boycotting his business, will be enjoined, if the injury
threatened is irreparable, though the acts charged may also
constitute a crime: Cwur D'Alene Consolidated & Min. Co. v.
Miners' Union of Wardner, 5 1 Fed. Rep. 260; Blindell v.
Hagan, 54 Fed. Rep. 40; Barr v. Essex Trades Council,
(N. J.) 3o Atl. Rep. 881 ; Jhtrdock v. Walker, 152 Pa. 595 ;
S. C., 25 Atl. Rep. 492. If these illegal acts constitute an
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interference with the executive powers of the government, it
may have an injunction against the offenders : I re Debs, 158
U. S. 564; S. C., 15 Sup. Ct. Rep. 900, affirming 64 Fed.
Rep. 724. See i A31r. L. REG. & REv. (N. S.) 609, 879.
But the mere apprehension of some future acts of a wrongful nature which may be injurious to the plaintiff is not a sufficient basis for a final injunction; that remedy becomes a
necessity only when it is perfectly clear upon the facts that,
unless it is granted, the plaintiff may be irreparably injured,
and that he can have no adequate remedy at law for the mischief done. In the absence of proof of such facts, the denial
of the relief sought is within the discretion of the court below,
with the proper exercise of which an appellate court will not
interfere: ReYnolds v. Everett, 144 N. Y. 189; S. C., 39 N.E.
Rep. 72. See Longs/ore Printing & Pub. Co. v. Howell,
(Oreg.) 38 Pac. Rep. 547.
Under the Revised Statutes of Missouri, § 8918, which
enacts that "in actions where one of the original parties to the
contract or cause of action in issue and on trial is
Witness,
Competency, dead . . . . the other party to such contract or
Transaction cause of action shall not be admitted to testify,
with
Decedent,

either in his own favor or in favor of any party to
the action claiming under him," it has been lately
ruled, that though a party to an action by the heirs of a decedent for partition cannot testify that money received by him
from deceased was a gift, and not at advancement, he can
testify to this effect in the case of money received by another
party; for these questions are separate issues, and are independent of the general questions involved : Gunn v. Thruston,
(Supreme Court of Missouri, Division No. i,) 32 S. W. Rep.
654Partition

